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The origins of both religion and complex societies represent evolutionary puzzles1–8. The 
moralizing gods hypothesis offers a solution to both puzzles by proposing that belief in 
morally concerned supernatural agents culturally evolved to facilitate cooperation 
among strangers in large-scale societies9–13. While previous research has suggested an 
association between presence of moralizing gods and social complexity3,6,7,9–18, the 
relationship between the two is disputed9,10,13,19,20,23,24, and attempts to establish 
causality have been hampered by limitations in the availability of detailed global 
longitudinal data. To overcome these limitations, we systematically coded records for 
414 societies spanning the last 10,000 years from 30 regions around the world, based on 
51 measures of social complexity and four measures of supernatural enforcement of 
morality. Our analyses confirm the association between moralizing gods and social 
complexity but reveal that moralizing gods follow, rather than precede, large increases 
in social complexity. Contrary to previous predictions9,12,16,18, powerful moralizing “big 
gods”, and prosocial supernatural punishment more generally, tend to appear only after 
the emergence of “megasocieties” with populations of greater than around a million. 
Although moralizing gods are not a prerequisite for the evolution of social complexity, 
they may help to sustain and expand complex multiethnic empires after they have 
become established. In contrast, rituals facilitating the standardization of religious 
traditions across large populations25,26 generally precede the appearance of moralizing 
gods.  This suggests that ritual practices were more important than the particular 
content of religious belief to the initial rise of social complexity.     
 
Supernatural agents that punish direct affronts to themselves (e.g. failure to perform 
sacrifices or observe taboos) are commonly represented in global history, but rarely are such 
deities believed to punish moral violations in interactions between humans2. Recent 
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millennia, however, have seen the rise and spread of several “prosocial religions” postulating 
either powerful “moralizing high gods” (MHG; e.g. the Abrahamic God), or more general 
“broad supernatural punishment” (BSP) of moral transgressions (e.g. karma in 
Buddhism)9,12,16–18. Such moralizing gods may have provided a crucial mechanism for 
overcoming the classic “free-rider problem” in large-scale societies11. The association 
between moralizing gods and complex societies has been supported by two forms of 
evidence: psychological experiments3,6,27,28 and cross-cultural comparative analyses 7,11,14–
18,20. 
 
The contributions of theistic beliefs to cooperation, as well as the historical question of 
whether moralizing gods precede or follow the establishment of large-scale cooperation, have 
been much debated9,10,12,23,24. Three recent studies that explicitly model temporal causality 
have come to contrasting conclusions. One applying phylogenetic comparative methods to 
infer historical changes in Austronesian religions reported that moralizing gods (specifically, 
BSP but not MHG) preceded the evolution of complex societies16. The same conclusion was 
reached through an analysis of historical and archaeological data from Viking-age 
Scandinavia18. But another study of Eurasian empires reported that moralizing gods followed, 
rather than preceded, the rise of complex, affluent societies20. All these studies, however, are 
restricted in geographic scope and use proxies for social complexity that the authors 
themselves concede are “very crude”20 (e.g. binary classification of societies as either “high” 
or “low” complexity). 
 
To overcome these limitations, we utilized Seshat: Global History Databank29 – a vast 
repository of standardized data on social structure, religion, and other domains for hundreds 
of societies throughout world history. Unlike other databases that attempt to model history 
using contemporary ethnographic data, Seshat directly samples over time as well as space. 
Seshat also includes estimates of expert disagreement and uncertainty, and uses more detailed 
variables than many databases.  
 
To test the moralizing god hypothesis, we coded data on 55 variables from 414 polities 
(independent political units) that occupied 30 geographic regions from the beginning of the 
Neolithic to the beginning of Industrial/Colonial periods (Fig. 1; Supplementary Dataset). We 
used a recently developed and validated measure of social complexity condensing 51 social 
complexity variables (Extended Data Table 5) into a single principal component capturing 
three quarters of the observed variation, dubbed “Social Complexity” (SC)8. The remaining 
four variables were selected to test the MHG and BSP sub-types of the moralizing gods 
hypothesis. One variable, MHG, was coded following the “moralizing high gods” variable 
standardly used in the literature on this topic11,14–17,30, requiring that a high god who created 
and/or governs the cosmos actively enforces human morality. Because “morality” is complex, 
multidimensional, and in some respects culturally relative, and because not all moralizing 
gods are “high gods”, we also coded three different variables related to BSP that are 
specifically relevant to prosocial cooperation: 1) reciprocity, 2) fairness, and 3) in-group 
loyalty. For analysis, these three variables were combined into a single BSP variable. See 
Methods, Supplementary Information, and http://seshatdatabank.info/methods/codebook for 
further methodological details, definitions, and justifications, including discussion of the 
relationship between MHG, BSP, and “Big Gods”.  
 
Figure 1 and Extended Data Table 1 show the temporal and geographical distribution of the 
appearance of moralizing gods in our sample. Although societies in all 30 regions possessed 
beliefs about appeasing supernatural agents through ritual performance, in 10 out of the 30 
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regions (light grey circles) there was no evidence for moralizing gods prior to their 
introduction by colonial powers. The remaining 20 regions displayed a diverse range of 15 
different systems of belief in moralizing gods: in some the first evidence of moralizing gods 
came in the form of MHG and in others it came in the form of BSP (Extended Data Table 1). 
The first appearance of moralizing gods in our sample was in Egypt, where the concept of 
supernatural enforcement of Maat (“order”) is attested by the 2nd Dynasty c. 2800BCE. This 
was followed by sporadic appearances in local religions throughout Eurasia (Mesopotamia c. 
2200BCE, Anatolia c. 1500BCE, China c. 1000BCE) before the wider spread of transnational 
religions began during the 1st millennium BCE with Zoroastrianism and Buddhism, followed 
later by Christianity and Islam. Although Christianity and Islam would eventually become the 
most widespread religions, local forms of moralizing gods were present well before they 
arrived in most regions (e.g. Roman gods were believed to punish oath-breaking from as 
early as 500BCE, almost a millennium before Christianity was adopted as the official Roman 
religion). The diverse range of religious systems represented in our global sample makes it 
possible to draw more general conclusions about religion than have previously been possible. 
 
While our sampling scheme reduces non-independence, our polities still cannot be considered 
statistically independent due to historical relationships among them. We controlled for these 
using a logistic regression model to account for temporal, geographical, and cultural 
dependencies in the global distribution of moralizing gods (see Methods). This analysis 
revealed that SC was a stronger predictor of moralizing gods than temporal, geographical, or 
linguistic relationships, and remained highly significant even after controlling for these 
relationships (z = 6.8, d.f. = 800, P < 10-11; Extended Data Table 2), conceptually replicating 
previous studies7,11,14,15.  
 
The moralizing gods hypothesis posits a “statistical causal relationship”10 in which 
moralizing gods facilitate the evolution of complex societies9,12,16–18. This implies that, on 
average, social complexity should increase more rapidly following the appearance of 
moralizing gods. To test this prediction, we conducted time-series analyses of the 12 regions 
for which SC data were available both before and after the appearance of moralizing gods 
(Fig. 2, Extended Data Table 1 & Extended Data Fig. 1). Surprisingly, average rates of 
increase of SC were over five times greater before the appearance of moralizing gods, not 
after (paired t = -6.6, d.f. = 199, P < 10-9; Fig. 2). This trend was significant both globally and 
individually for 10 out of the 12 regional time-series analyses (Extended Data Table 1 & 
Extended Data Fig. 1). None of these 12 regions displayed a significantly greater rate of 
increase in social complexity after the appearance of moralizing gods than before. Robustness 
analyses showed that our primary finding of higher rates of increasing social complexity 
before the appearance of moralizing gods was present regardless of the type of moralizing 
gods (MHG or BSP), the choice of variables used to estimate SC, uncertainty in the timing of 
appearance of moralizing gods, or the time-windows used to estimate rates of change in SC 
(Extended Data Table 4).  
 
In sum, although our analyses confirm earlier studies showing an association between 
moralizing gods and complex societies7,11,14–18,30 we find that moralizing gods usually follow, 
rather than precede, the rise of SC. Strikingly, most societies that exceeded a certain SC 
threshold developed a conception of moralizing gods. Specifically, in 10 out of the 12 regions 
analyzed, the transition to moralizing gods came within 100 years after exceeding an SC 
value of 0.6 (dubbed here a “megasociety”, as it corresponds roughly to a population on the 
order of one million; Extended Data Fig. 1). Importantly, this “megasociety threshold” does 
not seem to correspond to the point at which societies develop writing, which might have 
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suggested that moralizing gods were present earlier but not preserved archaeologically. While 
we cannot rule out this possibility, the fact that written records preceded the development of 
moralizing gods in 9 out of the 12 regions analyzed (by an average period of 400 years; Table 
S2), combined with the fact that evidence for moralizing gods is lacking in the majority of 
non-literate societies,2 suggests that such beliefs were not widespread before the invention of 
writing. Interestingly, the few small-scale societies that did display precolonial evidence of 
moralizing gods came from regions that had previously been used to support the claim that 
moralizing gods contributed to the rise of social complexity (Austronesia16 and Iceland18), 
suggesting that such regions are the exception rather than the rule. 
 
Conversely, of the societies in the 10 regions that did not develop precolonial moralizing 
gods, only one society exceeded (barely) the “megasociety threshold” (the short-lived Inca 
Empire, SC = 0.61). This suggests that, even if moralizing gods do not cause the evolution of 
complex societies, they may represent a cultural adaptation necessary to maintain cooperation 
in such societies once they have exceeded a certain size, perhaps due to the need to subject 
diverse populations in multiethnic empires to a common higher-level power9. This may 
explain why moralizing gods spread when large empires conquer smaller – but still complex 
– societies (e.g. the Spanish conquest of the Incas).  In some cases, moralizing doctrines may 
have helped to stabilize empires, while also limiting further expansion – as when Emperor 
Ashoka adopted Buddhism and renounced war following his final bloody conquest of the 
Kalinga Kingdom that established the maximum extent of the Mauryan empire.  
 
Although our results do not support the view that moralizing gods were necessary for the rise 
of complex societies, they also do not support a leading alternative hypothesis that moralizing 
gods only emerged as a byproduct of a sudden increase of affluence during a 1st millennium 
BCE “Axial Age”19,20,21,22. Instead, in three of our regions (Egypt, Mesopotamia, and 
Anatolia), moralizing gods appeared before 1500BCE. We propose that standardization of 
beliefs and practices via high-frequency repetition and enforcement by religious authorities 
enabled the unification of large populations for the first time, establishing common identities 
across states and empires25,26. Our data show that doctrinal rituals standardized via 
routinization (i.e. performed weekly or daily) or institutionalized policing (religions with 
multiple hierarchical levels) significantly predate moralizing gods, by an average of 1,100 
years (t = 2.8, d.f. = 11, P = .018; Fig. 2a). Doctrinal rituals precede moralizing gods in 9 out 
of the 12 regions analyzed, and even precede written records in 6 of these cases (by as much 
as 4,000 years in the case of Çatalhöyük in Anatolia; see Table S2). While analyses of rates 
of change of SC before and after the appearance of doctrinal rituals do not offer conclusive 
support for the hypothesis that doctrinal rituals facilitate increasing SC (Extended Data Table 
3), these data do at least suggest that doctrinal rituals led to the establishment of large-scale 
religious identities. In the future, higher-quality and higher-resolution archaeological data 
may allow for a more nuanced understanding of the timing and possible coevolution of the 
rise of doctrinal rituals and moralizing gods. Such data appear unlikely to affect our primary 
claim that complex societies preceded moralizing gods, but this is an empirical question open 
to future testing. 
 
This paper demonstrates how quantifying cultural characteristics of past societies can 
contribute to longstanding debates about the evolution of social complexity. Our results 
suggest that belief in moralizing gods was not the only or even the main factor enabling the 
expansion of human societies, but may have operated along with other features of ritual and 
religion to facilitate cooperation in increasingly complex social systems. In particular, an 
increase in ritual frequency and doctrinal control may have facilitated the establishment of 
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large-scale collective identities prior to the spread of beliefs in moralizing gods. Thus, when 
it comes to the initial rise of social complexity, how you worship may ultimately have been 
more important than what you worship. 
 
1. Darwin, C. The descent of man, and selection in relation to sex. (John Murray, 1871). 
2. Bellah, R. N. Religion in human evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age. 
(Harvard University Press, 2011). 
3. Purzycki, B. G. et al. Moralistic gods, supernatural punishment and the expansion of 
human sociality. Nature 530, 327–330 (2016). 
4. Watts, J., Sheehan, O., Atkinson, Q. D., Bulbulia, J. & Gray, R. D. Ritual human 
sacrifice promoted and sustained the evolution of stratified societies. Nature 532, 228–
231 (2016). 
5. Currie, T. E., Greenhill, S. J., Gray, R. D., Hasegawa, T. & Mace, R. Rise and fall of 
political complexity in island South-East Asia and the Pacific. Nature 467, 801–804 
(2010). 
6. Henrich, J. et al. Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and 
punishment. Science 327, 1481–1484 (2010). 
7. Botero, C. A. et al. The ecology of religious beliefs. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 
111, 16784–16789 (2014). 
8. Turchin, P. et al. Quantitative historical analysis uncovers a single dimension of 
complexity that structures global variation in human social organization. Proc. Natl. 
Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 115, E144–E151 (2018). 
9. Norenzayan, A. et al. The cultural evolution of prosocial religions. Behav. Brain Sci. 
39, (2016). 
10. Norenzayan, A. Big questions about Big Gods: Response and discussion. Religion 
Brain Behav. 5, 327–342 (2015). 
11. Johnson, D. God’s punishment and public goods. Hum. Nat. 16, 410–446 (2005). 
12. Johnson, D. D. P. The wrath of the academics: criticisms, applications, and extensions 
of the supernatural punishment hypothesis. Religion Brain Behav. (2017).  
13. Schloss, J. P. & Murray, M. J. Evolutionary accounts of belief in supernatural 
punishment: a critical review. Religion. Brain Behav. 1, 46–99 (2011). 
14. Roes, F. L. & Raymond, M. Belief in moralizing gods. Evol. Hum. Behav. 24, 126–
135 (2003). 
15. Peoples, H. C. & Marlowe, F. W. Subsistence and the evolution of religion. Hum. Nat. 
23, 253–269 (2012). 
16. Watts, J. et al. Broad supernatural punishment but not moralizing high gods precede 
the evolution of political complexity in Austronesia. Proc. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 282, 1–7 
(2015). 
17. Gray, R. D. & Watts, J. Cultural macroevolution matters. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. 
A. 114, 7846–7852 (2017). 
18. Raffield, B., Price, N. & Collard, M. Religious belief and cooperation: a view from 
Viking-Age Scandinavia. Religion Brain Behav. 9, 2–22 (2019). 
19. Baumard, N. & Boyer, P. Explaining moral religions. Trends Cogn. Sci. 17, 272–280 
(2013). 
20. Baumard, N., Hyafil, A., Morris, I. & Boyer, P. Increased affluence explains the 
emergence of ascetic wisdoms and moralizing religions. Curr. Biol. 25, 10–15 (2015). 
21. Mullins, D. A. et al. A systematic assessment of ‘Axial Age’ proposals using global 
comparative historical evidence. Am. Sociol. Rev. 83, 596–626 (2018). 
22. Purzycki, B. G. et al. Material security, life history, and moralistic religions: A cross-
cultural examination. PLoS One 13, e0193856 (2018). 
  
6 
23. Stausberg, M. Big Gods in review: Introducing Ara Norenzayan and his critics. 
Religion 44, 592–608 (2014). 
24. Mckay, R. & Whitehouse, H. Religion and morality. Psychol. Bull. 141, 447–473 
(2015). 
25. Whitehouse, H. Modes of religiosity: A cognitive theory of religious transmission. 
(AltaMira Press, 2004). 
26. Whitehouse, H., François, P. & Turchin, P. The role of ritual in the evolution of social 
complexity: Five predictions and a drum roll. Cliodynamics 6, 199–216 (2015). 
27. Norenzayan, A. & Shariff, A. F. The origin and evolution of religious prosociality. 
Science 322, 58–62 (2008). 
28. Shariff, A. F., Willard, A. K., Andersen, T. & Norenzayan, A. Religious priming: A 
meta-analysis with a focus on prosociality. Personal. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 20, 27–48 
(2016). 
29. Turchin, P. et al. Seshat: The Global History Databank. Cliodynamics 6, 77–107 
(2015). 
30. Murdock, G. P. Ethnographic atlas: A summary. Ethnology 6, 109–236 (1967). 
 
Acknowledgements We thank Q. Atkinson and A. Willard for feedback on an earlier version 
of the manuscript, and Erik Postma for discussions on parts of the statistical analyses. We 
gratefully acknowledge the contributions of our team of research assistants, post-doctoral 
researchers, consultants, and experts. See http://www.seshatdatabank.info for a 
comprehensive list of private donors, partners, experts, and consultants. This work was 
supported by a John Templeton Foundation grant to the Evolution Institute, entitled “Axial-
Age Religions and the Z-Curve of Human Egalitarianism,” a Tricoastal Foundation grant to 
the Evolution Institute, entitled “The Deep Roots of the Modern World: The Cultural 
Evolution of Economic Growth and Political Stability,” an ESRC Large Grant, entitled 
“Ritual, Community, and Conflict” (REF RES-060-25-0085), an Advanced Grant (“Ritual 
Modes: Divergent modes of ritual, social cohesion, prosociality, and conflict” grant 
agreement No. 694986) and a Starter Grant ("The Cultural Evolution & Ecology of 
Institutions" grant agreement No. 716212) from the European Research Council (ERC) under 
the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme, an award from the 
Templeton World Charity Foundation entitled “Cognitive and Cultural Foundations of 
Religion and Morality” (TWCF0164), a Keio Research Institute at SFC Startup Grant, a Keio 
Gijuku Academic Development Fund Individual Grant, and a grant from the European Union 
Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme (grant agreement No. 644055 
[ALIGNED, www.aligned-project.eu]). 
 
Author Contributions  
 
H.W., P.F., and P.E.S. designed the study, with input from P.T., T.C., K.F., and R.M.R. E.C. 
and R.P. coded the religion/ritual data, with additional input from J.L., J.B., B.t.H, 
A.C., and other Seshat contributors. P.E.S. analyzed the data, with input from H.W., 
P.F., P.T., T.C., and R.M.R. P.E.S., H.W., and P.F. drafted the manuscript.  
 
Author Information  
 
Reprints and permissions information is available at www.nature.com/reprints. The authors 
declare no competing financial interests. Correspondence and requests for materials should 
be addressed to P.E.S. (psavage@sfc.keio.ac.jp).  
 
  
7 
 
FIGURE LEGENDS 
 
Figure 1 | Locations of the 30 sampled regions on the world map, labeled according to precolonial 
evidence of moralizing gods. The area of each circle is proportional to social complexity (SC) of the earliest 
polity with moralizing gods to occupy the region, or the latest precolonial polity for regions without precolonial 
moralizing gods. For regions with precolonial moralizing gods, the date of earliest evidence of such beliefs is 
displayed in thousands of years ago (kya), coloured by type of moralizing gods. The three transnational religious 
systems representing the first appearance of moralizing gods in more than one region - Zoroastrianism, 
Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Islam, and Christianity), and Buddhism - are coloured red, orange, and blue 
respectively, while other local religious systems with beliefs in moralizing high gods (MHG) or broad 
supernatural punishment (BSP) are coloured yellow and purple, respectively. See Extended Data Table 1 for 
further details. 
 
Figure 2 | Social complexity before and after the appearance of moralizing gods. a) Time-series showing 
mean social complexity over time for 2,000 years before and after the appearance of moralizing gods (n = 12 
regions with pre-/post-moralizing gods SC data). Social complexity has been scaled so that the society with the 
highest SC (Qing Dynasty China c. 1900CE) has a value of 1 and that with the lowest SC (Early Woodland 
Illinois USA c. 400BCE) has a value of 0. Vertical bands represent the period in which moralizing gods and 
doctrinal rituals first appeared. All errors represent 95% confidence intervals, with the exception of the vertical 
bar for moralizing gods, which represents the mean duration of the polity in which moralizing gods appeared 
(because times are normalized to the time of first evidence of moralizing gods, and there is thus no variance in 
this parameter). b) Histogram of differences in rates of change in social complexity after minus before the 
appearance of moralizing gods (n = 200 time-windows from the 12 regions). The y-axis represents the number 
of time-windows out of 200. See Extended Data Fig. 1 for data for each of the 12 regions, and Extended Data 
Fig. 2 for a version extending beyond 2,000 years pre-/post-moralizing gods. These analyses treat either the 
presence of MHG or BSP as “moralizing gods” – see Extended Data Fig. 3 for an alternative analysis restricted 
only to the presence of MHG.  
 
 
METHODS 
 
Seshat: Global History Databank overview 
 
Seshat: Global History Databank (http://seshatdatabank.info/) is a vast storehouse of 
information about global history from the end of the Paleolithic up to the Industrial 
Revolution. Eventually, it is intended that Seshat will cover the history of all past human 
societies but initially the goal has been to capture as much diversity in global history as 
possible. We therefore created a stratified sample of past societies by identifying 10 world 
regions distributed as widely as possible across the Earth’s surface and within each of those 
regions designate three “natural geographic areas” (NGAs) with discrete ecological 
boundaries, on average about 10,000 km2 in size, creating an initial sampling scheme of 30 
such areas around the world. To maximise diversity in the sample, for each world region we 
chose one NGA in which social complexity was early emerging (e.g. Egypt), one where it 
arose relatively recently (e.g. Iceland), and one where is emerged somewhere in the middle of 
the range (e.g. Japan)29. The 30 regions and their selection rationale were published in 201529 
prior to beginning data collection. Our aim was to maximize variability in our global sample 
while minimizing historical relationships between cultures.  
 
Data on political systems (“polities”) that emerged and persisted for at least a century in each 
of the NGAs was then gathered and inputted into Seshat in a continuous time series at 100-
year intervals, going back as far into the history of that area as scholarly literature would 
allow (up to a maximum of roughly 10,000 years before present). In the case of NGAs that 
contain clusters of very small-scale polities that share a similar culture but are not under a 
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single system of jurisdictional control, we refer to these as “quasi-polities” and code 
information on all of them generically, unless information is available that would allow us to 
differentiate them.  
All the variables on which data has been gathered and entered into Seshat are derived from a 
Seshat Codebook that can be accesses and downloaded online 
(http://seshatdatabank.info/methods/codebook). The Codebook was designed by, and is 
continually updated and extended in consultation with, a large network of professional 
historians, archaeologists and other specialists whom we refer to as “Seshat Experts”. Most 
variables in Seshat require the data to take the form of a number or numerical range or they 
specify a feature that can be coded as either absent, present, or unknown (also coding items 
as “inferred present/absent” where the evidence permits). The first step in data entry is for 
trained Research Assistants (RAs) to gather and input easily acquired data and, while doing 
so, compile lists of data that present more difficulty to interpret, requiring input from Seshat 
Experts. Especially during the early phases of data entry, variables in the codebook are 
revised and improved through a continual back and forth between Research Assistants and 
Seshat Experts. All data are linked to scholarly sources, including peer reviewed publications 
but also personal communications from established authorities. On occasions when Seshat 
Experts disagree on a particular coding, we keep a record of disagreements so that analyses 
can be run that take into account contrasting interpretations. Once used for the purposes of 
data analysis and publication, that version of the dataset is “frozen” so that it can be inspected 
by others and used for the purposes of replication. Nevertheless, the data in Seshat 
continually evolves, for example as new sources are discovered and as new Seshat Experts 
contribute additional layers of interpretation.  
The data analyzed in the present paper focus on those sectors of the Seshat Codebook 
concerned with social complexity, religion, and ritual. A full account of the social complexity 
variables has been published elsewhere,8 using 51 variables (Extended Data Table 5) 
associated with population size, hierarchy, territory, governance, bureaucracy, infrastructure, 
record keeping, economic development, and other domains that were previously identified as 
potentially relevant measures of social complexity. This required engagement with a wide-
ranging body of literature on social complexity. Since previous researchers disagreed about 
which dimensions of social complexity were the most important to emphasize (e.g. number of 
jurisdictional levels versus more hierarchical or horizontal forms of complexity; autocracy 
versus democracy; diversity of specialist roles versus centralized coordination) we included 
proxies for all potentially relevant measures of social complexity that had been identified in 
the literature. This inclusive strategy was designed to allow us to investigate whether these 
different characteristics exhibited strong relationships with each other and whether a single 
principal component captures most of the observed variation. Our analyses confirmed that 
both are indeed the case and, furthermore, we found that different characteristics of social 
complexity are highly predictable across different world regions8. 
 
Whereas previous research has proposed an association between the rise of moralizing gods 
and the evolution of social complexity, measures used in the past to capture the latter have 
been comparatively crude. Variable selection and inclusion for moralizing gods was informed 
by existing literature on so-called “big gods”, “moralizing high gods”, and “broad 
supernatural punishment”, as well as psychological and cross-cultural comparative research 
on the hypothesized link between belief in moralizing gods and large-scale cooperation.  
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Data collection for the religion and ritual variables involved matching each fully trained RA 
with one or more Seshat Experts. Seshat Experts provided guidance on how to delineate the 
temporal and geographical boundaries of the polity, assembled an initial reading list and, 
where necessary, helped to interpret some of the key historiographical debates associated 
with the variables. RAs then populated the variables with data and presented this to Seshat 
Experts for review. The comments and suggestions made by the experts were then 
implemented by the RAs. The next stage required a second team of fully trained RAs to go 
over the gathered data and to conduct a series of quality checks, including vetting of the 
footnotes and the use of correct syntax for the machine-readable part of the data. Finally, this 
checked dataset was offered to the Seshat Experts for review. The coding of religion and 
ritual data required the input of experts every step of the way, given the frequent need for 
complex and nuanced interpretation of the evidence. By contrast, the data required for the 
social complexity variables frequently consisted of facts that RAs could procure with less 
supervision, allowing expert input and review to occur at a later stage of the process. 
 
Data coding 
 
Social Complexity (SC): The 51 variables used to construct the overall social complexity 
measure are shown in Extended Data Table 5. These variables were chosen because they 
reflect common features associated with social complexity and can be grouped into 9 
complexity characteristics (Polity population size, Capital population size, Polity Territory 
size, Hierarchy, Infrastructure, Government, Information systems, Texts, Money). Details of 
coding definitions for these variables have previously been published8,29.  
 
Moralizing High Gods (MHG):  
For consistency with previous studies that have generally used the “Moralizing High Gods” 
variable from the Ethnographic Atlas, the presence of MHG was coded as a binary variable 
based on this original definition:  
 
As outlined by Murdock30 (1967:52), a high god follows the definition of Guy Swanson31 
(1960: chapter III and appendix 1) as "a spiritual being who is believed to have created all 
reality and/or to be its ultimate governor, even though his sole act was to create other spirits 
who, in turn, created or control the natural world"… (1) "Absent or not reported," (2) 
"Present but not active in human affairs," (3) "Present and active in human affairs but not 
supportive of human morality" and (4) "Present, active, and specifically supportive of human 
morality."11,32 
 
Thus, a coding of high gods “present, active, and specifically supportive of human morality” 
was coded as MHG being present, while all other types were coded as absent. 
 
Broad Supernatural Punishment (BSP):  
 
The terms “big gods” and “moralizing high gods” are sometimes used interchangeably17, but 
can have different connotations. The term “moralizing high gods” (MHG) was developed and 
defined by Swanson31, who proposed that high gods were associated with social complexity 
(regardless of their moral concern). Swanson’s MHG variable was incorporated into 
Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas30,  resulting in it being widely used in cross-cultural research. 
Swanson’s ideas were extended by Johnson in his “supernatural punishment hypothesis”11,12, 
33, where he focused on the mechanism of morality enforcement rather than high gods, but 
used Swanson’s MHG variable for testing due to the availability of previous research using 
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this definition. Johnson’s ideas have been further developed by Norenzayan and colleagues9, 
10, 27,34 to include various additional mechanisms, most notably invoking cultural group 
selection to explain the rapid spread of moralizing gods without accompanying genetic 
changes.  
 
Norenzayan originally chose the term “Big Gods” (defined as “powerful, omniscient, 
interventionist, morally concerned gods”34) as the title of his monograph describing this 
theory. Later, however, Norenzayan and colleagues relaxed this definition and emphasized 
that the term “Big Gods” was a rhetorical device intended to include a broad range of morally 
concerned supernatural agents, not only MHGs: 
…powerful, all-knowing and morally concerned supernatural agents who are believed to 
monitor social interactions and to reward and sanction behaviors in ways that contribute to 
the cultural success of the group, including practices that effectively transmit the faith. 
Rhetorically, we call these "Big Gods," but we alert readers that we are referring to a 
multidimensional continuum of supernatural agents in which Big Gods occupy a particular 
corner of the space.9  
Watts et al.16 developed and coded a new variable they call “Broad Supernatural Punishment” 
which arguably more closely matches this relaxed definition of “Big Gods” than does the 
traditional “Moralizing High Gods” variable. Watts et al. define “Broad Supernatural 
Punishment” as follows:  
For BSP to be coded as present in a culture there must be the concept of a supernatural 
agent or process that reliably monitors and punishes selfish actions, and this concept must (i) 
be widely advocated within the community, (ii) involve punishment of a broad range of selfish 
behaviours and (iii) apply to a wide range of community members.  
 
Because “selfish actions” can occur in a variety of domains, Seshat subdivides the types of 
supernatural enforcement of morality based on nine proposed categories of morality35,36. For 
this study, we focused on three domains that are relevant to the establishment of large-scale 
cooperation: 1) fairness (sharing of resources; e.g. dividing disputed resources, bargaining, 
redistribution of wealth); 2) reciprocity (e.g. fulfilling contracts, returning gifts, repaying 
debts, upholding trust); and 3) in-group loyalty (the need to remain loyal to unrelated 
members of the same group; e.g. helping coreligionists, going to war for one's group).  
BSP was coded as present if at least one of these three sub-types of selfish actions was 
supernaturally enforced. 
 
Our robustness analyses analyzing BSP and MHG separately (Methods, Extended Data Table 
4) suggest that, rather than moralizing gods following a general pattern of evolution from 
“small” (BSP) to “big” (MHG), the presence or absence of “high gods” independent of their 
moralizing status has little functional relationship with social complexity, and instead appears 
largely contingent on history and geography. In regions such as Southern and Eastern Asia, 
BSP in the form of karmic religions (Buddhism, Hinduism) remains the dominant form of 
moralizing gods, whereas in regions such as Europe and Africa moralizing Abrahamic MHGs 
were commonly adopted or imposed wholesale without any intermediate evolution through a 
BSP stage. 
 
Doctrinal rituals:  
 
The “Modes of Religiosity” hypothesis focuses on two factors that facilitate standardization 
of a body of beliefs and practices. First, high frequency (e.g. daily or weekly) collective 
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rituals facilitate easy detection of deviations from the orthodox canon. Second, religious 
hierarchy enables enforcement of authorized belief and practice. Seshat codes five different 
types of rituals: the most frequent, most widespread, largest scale, most euphoric, and most 
dysphoric rituals. For each ritual, frequency is coded as daily, weekly, monthly, seasonally, 
yearly, generationally, or once-in-a-lifetime. Seshat also codes for levels of religious 
hierarchy. One represents no levels of religious hierarchy beyond the local priest/shaman, 
while higher numbers represent multiple levels of hierarchy (e.g. senior priests, High Druids). 
 
Making inferences about prehistoric rituals requires using various measurable archaeological 
proxies. Previous research has established that both frequent rituals and multi-level religious 
hierarchies tend to co-occur with other features of doctrinal rituals (e.g., low arousal)25,37,38,39. 
Not all of these features can always be found in the archaeological record, so in this paper we 
use the appearance of either religious hierarchy or frequent rituals as proxies for the 
appearance of doctrinal rituals. Doctrinal rituals were thus coded as present if the most 
frequent ritual occurred weekly or daily, or if there was evidence of multiple levels of 
religious hierarchy.  
 
Separate reanalyses were also conducted defining doctrinal rituals based only ritual frequency 
and only religious hierarchy. In both cases, doctrinal rituals still preceded moralizing gods by 
an average of over 200 years, although this difference only remained significant when using 
religious hierarchy as a proxy for doctrinal ritual (religious hierarchy: mean = 991 years, t = 
2.4, d.f. = 11, P = .035; ritual frequency: mean = 210 years, t = 1.1, d.f. = 11, P = .30).  
 
Note that we coded only aspects of ritual and religion associated with the official cult, and so 
the rituals of interest were not necessarily polity-wide but could be largely or wholly 
restricted to elite groups. 
 
Data collation 
 
The process of data collection for the MHG, BSP, and “doctrinal rituals” variables involved 
matching each fully trained research assistant (RA) with one or more experts (recognized 
authorities on the polity in question, typically holding a relevant doctorate and occupying a 
faculty position in a university). Experts provided guidance on how to delineate the temporal 
and geographical boundaries of the polity, assembled an initial reading list and, where 
necessary, helped to interpret some of the key historiographical debates associated with the 
variables. RAs then populated the variables with data and presented this to the experts for 
review. The comments and suggestions made by the experts were then implemented by the 
RAs. The next stage required a second team of fully trained RAs to conduct a series of 
quality checks, including vetting of the footnotes (which currently reference over 2,000 
unique academic sources) and the use of correct syntax for the machine-readable part of the 
data. Finally, this checked dataset was offered to the experts for review. By contrast, the data 
required for the social complexity variables frequently consisted of facts that RAs could 
procure with less supervision, allowing expert input to occur at a later stage of the process. 
Data vetting in Seshat is a continuously ongoing dynamic process that includes incorporation 
of disagreement among experts within the project and input from external experts via our 
open-access interface.  
 
There is room for reasonable disagreement about the most effective way of gathering data 
about world history, particularly regarding the role of expert contributors44,47. An alternative 
approach would be to have every single data point signed off by a single recognized expert, 
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perhaps even without requiring further citations. We trialed such an expert-driven approach 
to data entry during initial phases of our project but found it took too long to source experts 
and have them enter the data required. Instead we found faster progress could be made using 
the approach described above and having multiple points at which the data were examined 
and vetted. To this end, we have made not only all our data but also all of the metadata and 
references supporting these data available for everyone to examine and comment on. Rather 
than relying on the single authority of one expert for each entry, Seshat involves regional 
experts to help guide data collection and assess the quality of our data and meta-data as one 
of several complementary components in our quality control approach – which also includes 
incorporating disagreement among multiple experts.  
 
Analyses 
 
To ensure consistency and comparability in our analyses, we sampled polities at 100-year 
intervals, sampling whichever polity happened to occupy a given region at 100BCE, 0CE, 
100CE, etc., while not including polities that existed only between century boundaries8 (see 
SI for details and examples regarding the temporal sampling procedure). All analyses were 
performed in R V3.4.142. All P-values reported are two-tailed. 
 
Quantifying social complexity: 
In order to create an overall measure of social complexity (SC) we took a previously 
published approach based on principal component analysis (PCA)8 and applied it to the latest 
available data from Seshat. This method aggregates the 51 social complexity variables 
(Extended Data Table 5) into nine “complexity characteristics” and then analyses them using   
PCA.  
 
PCA is a commonly used tool for dimension reduction – in this case we have nine different 
aggregated variables that we want to reduce to a single variable that best captures social 
complexity. However, we obtain the same conclusions even without using PCA regardless of 
which of the nine complexity characteristics we choose as a proxy for social complexity 
(Extended Data Table 4). 
 
As shown previously, these different complexity characteristics turn out to be highly 
correlated and all load heavily onto a single principal component that captures 76% of the 
variance in the individual complexity characteristic variables. Our approach utilizes multiple 
imputation43 to account for missing data, uncertainty, and expert disagreement by imputing 
data based on a range of possible values and averaging the results over the course of 20 
imputations. The results of this approach have proven highly robust to a number of different 
modelling assumptions (see ref. 8 and SI). Full details of this approach and justifications for 
selecting the social complexity variables can be found in the previous paper (ref. 8). We 
carried out a number of robustness checks in that paper including cross-validation analysis 
and bootstrap resampling to assess whether our PCA methods were robust to spatial/temporal 
autocorrelation. Specifically, k-fold cross-validation showed that our multiple imputation 
methods accurately predicted complexity characteristic values when each geographic region 
was systematically removed from the analysis, while bootstrapping showed that removing 
different geographic regions and time periods did not affect our PCA results (see ref. 8 and 
the “Robustness checks” section in the SI for full details).  
 
Extensions of PCA (e.g. Generalized Low Rank Models [GLRM]44, spatio-temporal PCA 
[stPCA]45, singular spectrum analysis [SSA]46) may be worth considering in future analyses 
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as alternative methods of accommodating binary variables and spatial/temporal 
autocorrelation. Note, however, that the subsequent regression analyses performed in this 
paper explicitly control for spatial, temporal and phylogenetic autocorrelation. More 
importantly, our current results consistently failed to support the temporal sequence of the 
moralizing gods hypothesis across all geographic regions (Extended Data Table 1 and 
Extended Data Fig. 1), and robustness analyses using each of the nine complexity 
characteristics independently without performing PCA also confirm our main findings 
(Extended Data Table 4). This confirms that our primary finding that complex societies 
precede moralizing gods cannot be an artefact of autocorrelation in our PCA methods. 
 
Logistic regression: 
In order to examine the association between moralizing gods and social complexity while 
controlling for non-independence in our data due to spatial/temporal autocorrelation and 
historical connections between cultures47, we fitted a logistic regression model to the data. A 
detailed description of this model has previously been published along with extensive 
validation of its robustness when applied to Seshat data48. This approach stems from the field 
of nonlinear dynamical systems, and is similar in spirit to the concept of “Granger 
causality”53,54 commonly used in economics, in that both employ linear models with time-
lagged variables. 
 
Our approach is similar to that adopted by Botero et al.7, except that we use more fine-
grained measures of geographical diffusion and linguistic similarity, and also incorporate 
temporal information, as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎 +∑𝑏𝜏𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝜏
𝜏
+ 𝑐∑exp [−
𝛿𝑖,𝑗
𝑑
]
𝑖≠𝑗
𝑌𝑗,𝑡−1 + ℎ∑𝑤𝑖,𝑗
𝑖≠𝑗
𝑌𝑗,𝑡−1 +∑𝑔𝑘
𝑘
𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 
Here Yi,t is the binary variable coding presence of absence of moralizing gods in location i at 
time t. The time step Δt = 100 years. Starting from the first term on the right-hand side, a is 
the regression constant (intercept). The next term captures the influences of past history 
(autoregressive terms), with τ = 1, 2, … indexing time-lagged values of Y (as time is 
measured in centuries, Yi,t – 1 refers to presence or absence of moralizing gods 100 years 
before t). The third term represents potential effects resulting from geographical 
diffusion49,50. We use a negative-exponential form to relate the distance between society i and 
society j, δi,j, to the influence of j on i because, unlike with a linear kernel, negative-
exponential does not become negative at very long δi,j, instead approaching 0 smoothly. We 
avoid the problem of endogeneity by using time lagged Yj,t – 1. The third term, thus, is a 
weighted average of moralizing gods occurrence in the vicinity of society i at the previous 
time step, with weights falling off to 0 as distance from i increases. Parameter d measures 
how steeply the influence falls with distance, and was set to d = 1000km after optimizing the 
AIC value using 200km increments from 200-2000km (d = 200, 400, 600, … 2000km). 
Parameter c is a regression coefficient measuring the importance of geographical diffusion. 
Detecting autocorrelations due to shared cultural history (next term) is done analogously, 
except w now represents the weight due to linguistic similarity (set to 1 if societies i and j 
share the same language, 0.5 if they are in the same linguistic genus, 0.25 if they are in the 
same linguistic family, and 0 if they are in different linguistic families; linguistic genera and 
families were taken from Glottolog51 and the World Atlas of Language Structures52). The rest 
of the right-hand side represents effects of predictor variables Xk,i,t – 1 (time-lagged); gk are 
regression coefficients, and εi,t is the error term. This approach allows us to investigate the 
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effects of the predictor variable (social complexity [SC], calculated above via principal 
component analysis), while controlling for serial autocorrelations, spatial diffusion, and 
autocorrelations due to shared cultural history.  
The regression results are detailed in Extended Data Table 2.  
 
Pre-/post-moralizing gods comparison: 
To more directly examine the direction of causality predicted by the moralizing gods 
hypothesis, we created time-series of SC over time for all 12 regions for which social 
complexity data were available both before and after the appearance of moralizing gods 
(Extended Data Fig. 1). We then compared rates of change in social complexity over time 
before and after moralizing gods using sliding time-windows. First, we compared rates of 
change using a 100-year window (i.e. comparing the rate for the 100 years before the 
appearance of moralizing gods with the rate for the 100 years after), then repeated this using 
a 200-year window, 300-year window, and so on up to a maximum of between 700- and 
3,900-years windows depending on the region. 
 
Different regions have different time-depths of data available for making these comparisons.  
The region with the shallowest time-depth was in Mali (±700 years before/after the 
appearance of Islam c. 1100CE [400CE-1800CE]), while the region with the deepest time-
depth was in Iran (±3,900 years before/after evidence of the moralizing Mesopotamian sun 
god Shamash c. 2200BCE [6100BCE-1700CE]). If we used all available data (up to ±3,900 
years), we risked weighting the analyses too heavily toward regions such as Iran with deep 
time-depths, while using only a consistent upper limit of a maximum of ±700 years risks 
throwing away too much data. As a compromise, we conducted analyses using an 
intermediate upper limit of a maximum of ±2,000 years (Fig. 2b), but also repeated the 
analyses using extreme upper limits of ±700 years and ±3,900 years (see robustness analyses 
below). All of these choices produced qualitatively identical results (Extended Data Table 4).  
 
Note that these analyses do not attempt to construct a single “average rate of change before 
moralizing gods”, a single “average rate of change after moralizing gods”, and compare these 
average rates. We cannot assume such a constant rate of change, and indeed Fig. 2a shows 
that rates of change are clearly not constant. Instead, these analyses calculate a difference 
value for each time window (e.g. subtracting the rate of change for the 100-year period before 
moralizing gods from the rate of change for the 100-year period after, then doing the same for 
a ±200-year period, etc.). The key prediction of the moralizing gods hypothesis is that these 
difference values should tend to be positive (i.e. for a given time-window, the rate of change 
after moralizing gods should be greater than the rate before). However, Fig. 2b demonstrates 
that, in fact, the distribution of difference values was significantly negative (paired t-tests, P 
< 10-9). 
  
Robustness analyses: 
To explore the robustness of our results to modeling assumptions, we ran the following 
robustness analyses: 
 
To ensure that the analyses are not affected by the fact that religious hierarchy is included as 
one of social complexity variables in addition to being one of the variables used to define 
doctrinal mode, we re-ran the analyses after removing the religious hierarchy variable from 
the social complexity variables. We chose to do this for robustness analyses rather than the 
primary analysis in order to use the same 51 SC variables used in our previously published 
studies8,48 for consistency. 
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To ensure that the observed plateauing of SC was not simply an artefact of a ceiling effect 
wherein polities “max out” certain variables, we re-ran the analyses twice after splitting the 
SC variables in two subsets. The “scale” subset (2a) contained only the subset of seven SC 
variables for which there was no theoretical maximum value (from the categories “Polity 
Population”, “Polity Territory”, “Capital Population”, and “Hierarchy”). The “non-scale” 
subset (2b) contained the remaining 44 SC variables for which there was a theoretical 
maximum that could be attained once all our variables were present in a society (from the 
categories “Government”, “Money”, “Infrastructure”, “Information Systems”, and “Texts”).  
 
To examine whether our results were affected by the definition of “moralizing gods”, we re-
ran the analyses limiting the definition of moralizing gods exclusively to “moralizing high 
gods” (MHG), rather than the more inclusive definition of “broad supernatural punishment” 
(BSP) used in the primary analysis. 
 
Our primary analysis treated moralizing gods as being present from the beginning of the 
polity in which they appeared. To ensure that our analyses were not affected by dating 
uncertainty, we re-ran the analyses randomly resampling to treat moralizing gods as 
appearing at some point from within the full date range of this polity (e.g. 2900-2700BCE for 
Egypt). 
 
Our primary analysis used time-windows of up to 2,000 years before and after the appearance 
of moralizing gods, because 2,000 was intermediate between the maximum time-window for 
the region with the shallowest time-depth (±700 years for Mali) and the deepest time-depth 
(±3,900 years for Iran). To examine whether our results were affected by the depth of the 
time-window used, we re-ran analyses using consistent time-windows for each region of up 
to 700 years before/after moralizing gods (since ±700 was the maximum time-window 
possible for Mali; 5a), and also using the full time-window available for each region (i.e. as 
wide as 3,900 years for Iran; 5b).    
 
In order to ensure that our results were not affected by possible autocorrelation in our use of 
PCA to extract a measurement of social complexity, we re-ran the analysis nine times using 
each of the nine individual “complexity characteristics” as a measure of social complexity 
without performing any PCA.    
 
All of these robustness analyses (16 in total) produced qualitatively identical results in which 
the rate of increase of social complexity was significantly greater before the appearance of 
moralizing gods than afterwards (more than double in all cases; Extended Data Table 4), 
confirming that our primary conclusion that complex societies precede moralizing gods is 
highly robust. 
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Code availability: Source code is available online at http://github.com/pesavage/moralizing-
gods. 
 
Data availability: The full machine-readable dataset is available as Supplementary Dataset 
1, and at http://seshatdatabank.info/datasets. Full codings with detailed explanations and 
references are available at http://seshatdatabank.info/data, and are summarized in Table S2. 
The data include the coded levels of uncertainty and disagreement, the textual explanations, 
and the references for each of the variables for all polities used in our analysis. These 
webpages also make it possible to comment on each of our data points and suggest additions 
or corrections and thus provide an up-to-date and dynamic dataset undergoing continual 
improvement by members of the Seshat team and also external scholars. To maximize 
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transparency, we have tied each cluster of variables to the names of the research assistants 
who gathered the data and the names of the experts who reviewed the data. 
 
Extended Data Legends 
 
Extended Data Figure 1 | Social complexity time-series for individual regions. The 12 regions for which 
social complexity data are available both before and after the appearance of moralizing gods are shown. Vertical 
bands represent the period in which the first evidence of moralizing gods (red) and doctrinal rituals (blue) 
appeared. Grey shading represents 95% confidence intervals based on principal component analysis using 
multiple imputation8. 
 
Extended Data Figure 2 | Full time-series showing mean social complexity over time before and after the 
appearance of moralizing gods. n = 12 regions with pre-/post-moralizing gods SC data. Social complexity has 
been scaled so that the society with the highest SC (Qing Dynasty China c. 1900CE) has a value of 1 and that 
with the lowest SC (Early Woodland Illinois USA c. 400BCE) has a value of 0. Vertical bands represent the 
period in which moralizing gods and doctrinal rituals first appeared. All errors represent 95% confidence 
intervals, with the exception of the vertical bar for moralizing gods, which represents the mean duration of the 
polity in which moralizing gods appeared (because times are normalized to the time of first evidence of 
moralizing gods, and there is thus no variance in this parameter). Lack of confidence intervals indicates data 
from only a single region. This figure is identical to Fig. 2a, except that it also includes all available data pre-
/post- moralizing gods, rather than restricting to a window of 2,000 years pre-/post-moralizing gods. 
 
Extended Data Figure 3 | Social complexity before and after the appearance of moralizing high gods. This 
is a version of Fig. 2 in which analyses are restricted only to “moralizing high gods” (MHG) rather than the 
broader definition of “moralizing gods” used in Fig. 2 and elsewhere that includes “broad supernatural 
punishment” (BSP) as well as MHG. a) Time-series showing mean social complexity over time for 2,000 years 
before and after the appearance of moralizing high gods (n = 10 regions with pre-/post-moralizing high gods SC 
data). Social complexity has been scaled so that the society with the highest SC (Qing Dynasty China c. 
1900CE) has a value of 1 and that with the lowest SC (Early Woodland Illinois USA c. 400BCE) has a value of 
0. Vertical bands represent the period in which moralizing high gods and doctrinal rituals first appeared. All 
errors represent 95% confidence intervals, with the exception of the vertical bar for moralizing high gods, which 
represents the mean duration of the polity in which moralizing high gods appeared (because times are 
normalized to the time of first evidence of moralizing high gods, and there is thus no variance in this parameter). 
b) Histogram of differences in rates of change in social complexity after minus before the appearance of 
moralizing high gods (n = 158 time-windows from the 10 regions). The y-axis represents the number of time-
windows out of 158.  
 
Extended Data Table 1 | Rates of change in social complexity before and after the earliest precolonial 
evidence of moralizing gods for the 30 regions in Figure 1 
For locations without precolonial concepts of moralizing gods, the polity represents the latest polity analyzed. 
See Table S2 and http://seshatdatabank.info/data for details and references. “MHG” = Moralizing high gods, 
“BSP” = Broad supernatural punishment. Rates of change before vs. rates after moralizing gods were compared 
using paired t-tests on up to 20 time-windows (100-2,000 years before/after the appearance of moralizing gods) 
for all 12 regions with social complexity data available both before and after the appearance of moralizing gods. 
Negative t-values represent higher rates of change before moralizing gods. *P < .05; **P < .01; ***P < .001  
 
Extended Data Table 2 | Logistic regression results predicting moralizing gods  
The model includes parameters for social complexity and for geographical, temporal, and cultural relationships, 
ordered by absolute z-value (see Methods for details). 
 
Extended Data Table 3 | Analyses  with doctrinal rituals instead of moralizing gods as the dependent 
variable  
See Tables S3-S5 for full regression results 
 
Extended Data Table 4 | Robustness analyses modifying modeling assumptions of the analyses  
See Methods for details, and see Extended Data Table 2 and Tables S6-18 for full regression results 
 
Extended Data Table 5 | List of the 51 social complexity variables analyzed 
See ref. 8  and http://seshatdatabank.info/methods/codebook/ for full definitions and selection rationale 
